In this paper, a nonlinear mathematical model to study the dynamics of an inshoreoffshore fishery under variable harvesting is proposed and analyzed. Criteria for local stability, instability and global stability of the system are derived. The optimal harvesting policy is discussed by considering taxation as a control instrument. It is shown that the fishery resources can be protected from overexploitation by increasing the tax and discount rates.
Introduction
The optimal management of renewable resources such as fishery and forestry is very important as they are directly linked to sustainable development. With the development of modern technology, these resources are overexploited to make maximum profit. Economic and biological management of renewable resources have been discussed by many researchers [1, 5-10, 16, 19-22] . Clark and De Pree [9] investigated the implication of restricted malleability of capital for the optimal exploitation of a renewable resource stock. Kitabatake [18] presented a dynamic model for fishery resources and showed that the use of diesel-powered trawling may lead to the extinction of predator as well as prey species if the trawling efficiency in the catch of prey species is improved. Chaudhuri [11] studied the problem of combined harvesting of two competing fish species and showed that open-access fishery may have a bionomic equilibrium implying the extinction of one of the species. Mesterton-Gibbons [20] proposed a model to study the optimal policy for the combined harvesting of two ecologically independent species and obtained criteria for the survival of less productive species as a function of the system parameters and initial stocks. This work was further extended to study an optimal policy for maximizing the present value 27 of the combined harvest of two ecologically dependent predator-prey species [21] . Chaudhuri [12] further considered the dynamic optimization problem of combined harvesting for two competing fish species and showed that optimal singular control may exist if the shadow price of each species is less than or equal to the actual price, and the optimal population size of each species is greater than or equal to its maximum sustainable yield size. Ganguli and Chaudhuri [15] proposed a model to study the regulation of single-species fishery by taxation. Mesterton-Gibbons [22] also described a technique to find an optimal harvesting policy for a Lotka-Volterra ecosystem of two interdependent populations. Chattopadhyay et al. [4] studied a resource based competitive system in three species fishery and derived conditions for the persistence and global stability of the system. Mukhopadhyay et al. [23] proposed a model for two competing fish species with selective harvesting by incorporating discrete time delay. Hanson and Ryan [17] examined the effects of random price fluctuations on the computed optimal harvest strategy and return for a stochastic Schaefer model. They showed that random price fluctuations strongly affect the optimal return but have a less significant impact on optimal effort. Fan and Wang [14] investigated the exploitation of a single-species and proved that the time dependent logistic equation with periodic coefficient has a unique positive periodic solution, which is globally asymptotically stable for positive solutions. Pradhan and Chaudhuri [24] developed a single-species fishery model using the Gompertz law of population growth. In their further work [25] , a mathematical model for growth and exploitation of a schooling fish species has been studied by imposing a tax on the catch to control the overexploitation of fish species. Pradhan and Chaudhuri [26] also presented a model to study nonselective harvesting of two-species fishery, focussing attention on the use of taxation as an instrument to control exploitation of fishery.
It may be pointed out here that with the development of technology, offshore fishing has become more intensive than those in the inshore area. In the above literature survey, we find very little work on inshore-offshore fishery [6] . Clark [6] developed an explicit model to study the dynamics of inshore-offshore fishery. Recently, Pradhan and Chaudhuri [27] described an inshore-offshore fishery model with selective harvesting. But in these two investigations, it has been assumed that offshore population diffuses into the inshore area at a rate proportional to the difference of offshore and inshore populations. In general, this may not be true and fishes may diffuse with the rate which is proportional to the respective population. Therefore, in this paper, a nonlinear mathematical model for the dynamics of inshore-offshore fishing is proposed and analyzed by considering different diffusion rates of fish population from one region to the other. Also in the previous work on inshore-offshore fishery, effort has been considered as a control variable, which is always not a realistic control variable. Other suggested control variables are taxation, catch-quotas, subsidies, fishing period control, etc. [6, 13, 15] . Taxation is recommended by economists to use as a control variable perhaps because due to its flexibility and better use by the regulatory agencies. In the present article, we consider effort as a dynamic variable and taxation as a control instrument to protect inshore-offshore fish populations from overexploitation. The model is analyzed using stability theory of ordinary differential equations. Criteria for the existence of nonnegative equilibria and for their stability behavior are derived. Finally, an optimal harvesting policy is discussed with the help of Pontryagin's Maximum Principle [3] .
Mathematical Model
Consider an open-access marine ecosystem where we wish to model the dynamics of inshore-offshore fish populations. Let x 1 (t) and x 2 (t) be the respective biomasses of inshore and offshore subpopulations of the same fishery at a time t. Let the inshore subpopulation diffuse into offshore area at a rate σ 1 , and the offshore subpopulation diffuse into inshore area at a rate σ 2 . Let E, a dynamic variable, be the total effort out of which ηE(0 ≤ η ≤ 1) is applied for harvesting inshore subpopulation, and (1 − η)E is applied for harvesting offshore subpopulation. The case η = 0 implies that total effort is invested in offshore area and the inshore fishery is closed, whereas η = 1 implies that total effort is invested in inshore area and the offshore fishery is closed. We assume that inshore area is the breeding area and growth of inshore subpopulation follows the logistic law of growth. Keeping these in view, the dynamics of inshore-offshore subpopulations of the same fishery may be governed by the following autonomous differential equations:
In the above model, r is the intrinsic growth rate of inshore subpopulation and K is its carrying capacity, d 0 is the natural death rate of offshore subpopulation, q 1 and q 2 are catchability coefficients of inshore and offshore subpopulations respectively, c 1 and c 2 are constant fishing costs per unit effort in the inshore and offshore area respectively, τ is the tax and p is the constant price per unit biomass of the landed fish. Since inshore and offshore populations consist of the same fishery, the price for both inshore and offshore populations are assumed the same. α 0 is a positive constant and is called stiffness parameter measuring the strength of reaction of effort to the perceived rent.
In the next section we first discuss the model without harvesting.
The Case of Unexploited Fishery
In this case E = 0 and model (2.1) reduces to
It can be checked that the above model (3.1) has only two nonnegative equilibrium points, namelyP 0 (0, 0) andP (x 1 ,x 2 ), wherex 1 andx 2 are given bȳ
, (3.2a)
It is noted here that the equilibrium level of inshore fish population is always less than its carrying capacity whereas the equilibrium level of offshore fish population is a part of the inshore fish population in the sense that breeding takes place only in the inshore area and diffusion takes place from one region to another. Thus, it follows thatx 2 <x 1 and it is true only when σ1 σ2+d0 < 1 so that σ 1 − σ 2 < d 0 . Thus the difference of two diffusion rates is less than the intrinsic death rate of the offshore subpopulations. In that case,
This implies that the intrinsic growth rate of inshore subpopulation must exceed the intrinsic death rate of the offshore subpopulation. Using the Routh-Hurwitz criteria, it is easy to check that the equilibriumP 0 is a saddle point and the equilibriumP is locally asymptotically stable in the x 1 − x 2 plane. In the following theorem, we are able to prove thatP is globally asymptotically stable (see Appendix A). Theorem 1. The interior equilibriumP is globally asymptotically stable with respect to all solutions initiating in the interior of the positive quadrant.
The above theorem implies that in the case of no harvesting, biomasses of inshore and offshore subpopulations always tend to their respective equilibrium levels and the equilibrium level of fish populations in the inshore area is always less than the carrying capacity while in the offshore region, it is proportional to the equilibrium level of fish population in the inshore region. 
Effect of Harvesting
In this section, we consider the complete model (2.1) and discuss its stability character. It can be seen that model (2.1) has three nonnegative equilibria, namely
2 , E * ). Herex 1 andx 2 are given by (3.2a, b), and thus the equilibrium P 1 exists under the condition (3.3). From Fig. 1 , it may be noted that the interior equilibrium P * exists if, in addition to (3.3), the following inequality holds (see Appendix B):
wherex 1 is given by (3.2a) and
Remark 1. Equation (4.1a) can be rewritten as
where p 1 is given by
This gives the range of tax for the existence of a positive equilibrium. Thus, for the steadiness of the system, the above range of tax can be adopted by the regulatory agency.
Remark 2. From Fig. 1 , we note that 
This shows that x 1 decreases as q 1 increases. It may also be noted that if the catchability coefficient of offshore subpoulation becomes very high, then for the survival of inshore population, we must have
From (4.1b), it follows that x 1a decreases as q 1 increases. 
Stability analysis
In this section, we first study the local stability behavior of nonnegative equilibria. For this, we compute variational matrices corresponding to each equilibrium and apply the Routh-Hurwitz criteria to know the sign of real parts of eigenvalues. Adopting this method, it can be seen that the equilibrium P 0 is a saddle point if inequality (3.3) holds. P 1 is also a saddle point with locally stable manifold in the x 1 − x 2 plane and with locally unstable manifold in the E-direction, if the following inequality holds:
If the above inequality is reversed, then P 1 is locally asymptotically stable. It may be noted here that the quantity in the left hand side of Eq. (4.5) is just the eigenvalue of the variational matrix computed at the equilibrium point P 1 in the E-direction.
In the following theorem, we show that the positive equilibrium P * is locally asymptotically stable (see Appendix C).
Theorem 2. Let the following inequality holds
Then the positive equilibrium P * is locally asymptotically stable.
The above theorem implies that if the condition (4.6) holds, then we can find a small circle with centre P * such that any solution (x 1 (t), x 2 (t), E(t)) of model (2.1), which is inside the circle at some point t = t 1 , will remain inside the circle for all t ≥ t 1 , and will tend to (x * 1 , x * 2 , E * ) as t → ∞. The following lemma shows that the system (2.1) is bounded, and it establishes a region of attraction for all solutions initiating in the interior of the positive orthant. The proof of this lemma is deferred to Appendix D.
attracts all solutions initiating in the interior of the positive orthant, where w(t) = α 0 (p − τ ){x 1 (t)+x 2 (t)} + E(t), µ < min{d 0 , α 0 (c 1 η + c 2 (1 − η)} and µ 0 is a positive constant defined suitably in the proof of the lemma.
In the following theorem we are able to write down criteria for P * to be globally asymptotically stable.
Theorem 3. Let the following inequality holds
Then P * is globally asymptotically stable with respect to all solutions initiating in the interior of the positive orthant (see Appendix E).
It is interesting to note that the condition (4.7) implies the condition (4.6). This shows that under certain parametric conditions, the inshore-offshore subpopulations will settle down to their respective equilibrium level.
Optimal Harvesting Policy
In this section, we employ the utility function, which in neoclassical microeconomics, is defined as the mathematical representation of the relative measure of satisfaction of an agent. The greater value it has, the more satisfaction the economic agent has. In our present study, the utility function, π(x 1 , x 2 , E, τ, t), is the net economic revenue and is given by π(x 1 , x 2 , E, τ, t) = net economic revenue from inshore fishery + net economic revenue from offshore fishery
Thus our objective is to maximize the present value, I, of a continuous time stream of revenues given by
subject to the state equations (2.1) and to the control constraints
where δ is the instantaneous annual rate of discount [6] . τ min < 0 may be considered as the case of subsidies which will have the effect of increasing the rate of expansion of the fishery. Now we wish to find out the path traced out by (x 1 (t), x 2 (t), E(t)) with the optimal tax τ (t) so that if the inshore-offshore subpopulations and the harvesting effort are kept along this path, then the regulatory agency will be assured to achieve its objective. To solve this optimization problem we utilize the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle [3] . Using this principle, we find (see Appendix F) an equation to the singular path as
where a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 are defined in Appendix F.
For an optimal effort, we have
from which we obtain
Equation (5.3) together with Eq. (5.4) gives the optimal equilibrium population
. Then the optimal equilibrium levels of effort and tax are given respectively by
Remark 5. From Eqs. (F.8) and (F.9) of Appendix F, we note that λ i (t)e δt (i = 1, 2) is independent of time in an optimum equilibrium. Hence they satisfy the transversality condition at ∞, i.e., they remain bounded as t → ∞.
Remark 6. From Eq. (F.6) of Appendix F, we note that 
Hence net economic revenue is
This shows that in the case of infinite discount rate, the net economic rent is zero, and hence both the inshore and the offshore fisheries remain unexploited. Thus we conclude that whenever there is a danger of fish extinction, the regulatory agency may increase the tax and or discount rate to discourage the fishing agency for harvesting the fish species.
Summary
In this paper, a nonlinear mathematical model to study the dynamics of an inshoreoffshore fishery has been proposed and analyzed. It has been assumed that the inshore population diffuses into offshore area and vice-versa with different diffusion rates. The effort has been considered as a dynamic variable and taxation as a control instrument to protect the fish populations from overexploitation. The harvest term has been assumed to follow the catch-per-unit-effort hypothesis [6] .
If inshore and offshore subpopulations are not harvested, then it has been found that populations in both the regions settle down at their respective equilibrium levels. The equilibrium level of inshore subpopulation is always less than its carrying capacity and the equilibrium level of offshore subpopulation is proportional to the inshore subpopulation. In the case of harvesting, it has been shown that under certain parametric conditions the inshore and offshore subpopulations settle down to their respective equilibrium levels, the magnitudes of which depend upon the intrinsic growth rate, diffusion rate, catchability coefficients and the effort invested. For the steadiness of the system, a finite range of tax has been obtained and it is found that any regulatory agency must follow these parametric conditions at the time of tax formulation per unit biomass of the landed fish. Using Pontryagin's Maximum Principle it has been shown that the total user's cost of harvest per unit of effort is equal to the present value of marginal revenue of effort at the optimum equilibrium level. It has also been shown that if the discount rate increases, then the economic rent decreases and even may tend to zero if the discount rate tend to infinity. Thus it has been concluded that the regulatory agency may increase the tax/discount rate to discourage the fishing agency whenever there is a possibility of fish extinction. It has also been noted that if the catchability coefficients of the inshore and the offshore fish populations increase with the improvement of sophisticated fishing instruments, there exists a danger of extinction of fish population. Hence for conservation and sustainable development, taxation may be a good instrument to apply and the range of tax may be obtained from Eq. (4.2a).
As mentioned in the introduction of this article, a very few literatures [6, 27] are available in the area of inshore-offshore fishery, there is always of a scope for further study in this area. For example, catch-quotas, subsidies and fishing period control may also be good instrumentations to apply for the protection of fish populations from overexploitation.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the following positive definite function aboutP ,
Now differentiating V 1 with respect to time t along the solutions of model (3.1), we get,
This shows thatV 1 is negative definite; hence the theorem follows.
Appendix B. Proof for the Existence of Interior Equilibrium
Here x * 1 , x * 2 , E * are the positive solutions of the following algebraic equations
Substituting the value of x 2 from (B.2) into (B.1) and (B.3), we get
From (B.4), we note the following:
(ii) When
where
Also it is easy to verify that dx1 dE < 0. Now from Eq. (B.5), we note the following:
, where x 1a is given by (4.1b).
It is also easy to verify that dx1 dE > 0. Thus from the above analysis it is clear that the two isoclines (B.4) and (B.5) intersect at a unique point (E * , x * 1 ) under conditions (3.3) and (4.1a). This proves the existence of the positive equilibrium P * .
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 2
To prove this theorem, we first linearize model (2.1) by considering the transformations
Then we get the linear system as
Consider the following positive definite function along model (C.2),
where k 1 , k 2 are positive constants to be chosen suitably in the subsequent steps. Differentiating V 2 with respect to time t, we get
dt is negative definite under condition (4.6), proving the theorem.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 1
Define w = α 0 (p − τ ){x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)} + E(t). Let µ > 0 be a positive constant. Then from model (2.1) we have
Since right hand side of the above equation is bounded, it follows that there exists a positive constant µ 0 such that
Now applying the theory of differential inequality [2] , we get
and when t → ∞, we have 0 < w(x 1 (t), x 2 (t), E(t)) < µ 0 µ , proving the lemma .
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 3
In order to prove this theorem, we consider the following positive definite function around the positive equilibrium P * ,
where m 1 , m 2 are positive constants to be chosen suitably later on. Differentiating V with respect to time t along the solutions of model (2.1), a little algebraic manipulation yields 
